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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-FREEDOM OF
SPEECH---Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser-In Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Supreme Court held that
the first amendment does not prevent a school district from dis-
ciplining a student for giving an offensively lewd and indecent
speech at a school assembly.' Chief Justice Burger delivered the
opinion of the Court in which Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist
and O'Connor joined.2 Justice Blackmun concurred in the result,
and Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment.3 Justices Mar-
shall and Stevens filed dissenting opinions.4 This case is signifi-
cant because previous Supreme Court opinions have not dealt
specifically with the issue of first amendment protection of a
speech made by a high school student at a school sponsored as-
sembly.5 Applicable precedent addresses the issues of the rights
of nonverbal expression accorded older students or generally ob-
scene communication to a vast audience.6 In Fraser, the issue
arises in the context of an optional school sponsored assembly
before 600 fourteen-year-old students.
In April of 1983, 17-year-old Mathew Fraser was a high
school senior attending Bethel High School, a public school op-
erated by the defendant Bethel School District No. 403, in
Pierce County, Washington.8 On April 26, 1983, Fraser spoke on
behalf of a candidate for vice president of the Associated Stu-
dent Body at a school assembly during school hours, attended by
1. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 3167.
4. Id. at 3168-69.
5. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (Court upholds fourth amendment
search of student's purse by school official based upon reasonable suspicion that search
would produce "evidence that the student has or is violating either the law or the rules
of the school"); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (student's first amendment
rights are violated in the event that the Board of Education removes books from school
libraries based upon mere disapproval of the ideas contained in those books); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1968) (Court upholds right of
public school students to wear black armbands to protest Government policy in Vietnam
based upon first and fourteenth amendments).
6. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Tinker, 393 U.S 503.
7. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3160.
8. Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1357 (1985).
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approximately 600 students.9 Students had the option to attend
the assembly or go to a study hall.'" Fraser gave the following
nomination speech:
I know a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's
firm in his shirt, his character is firm - but most of all,
his belief in you, the students of Bethel is firm. Jeff
Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in.
If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He
doesn't attack things in spurts - he drives hard, pushing
and pushing until finally - he succeeds. Jeff is a man
who will go to the very end - even the climax, for each
and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for ASB vice-presi-
dent - he'll never come between you and the best our
high school can be."
During the speech a school counselor observed one male student
simulating masturbation while two students were observed simu-
lating sexual intercourse with movement of their hips. 2 No stu-
dents visibly indicated disapproval of the speech.'" The speech
created no disturbance at the time it was given, other than what
a school counselor present deemed "not atypical" of any other
Bethel school assembly. 4 The administration had no difficulty
maintaining order during the program.' 5 Fraser's speech did not
delay the proceedings, and the assembly was dismissed on
schedule. 6
Before giving the speech, Fraser privately presented it to
three different teachers seeking their comments." One teacher
stated that it might "raise eyebrows" but refrained from advis-
ing Fraser not to give the speech.'" The other two teachers ad-
vised Fraser not to give the speech, suggesting it was "inappro-
9. Id. at 1357.
10. Id. at 1364 ("Attendance, moreover, was not compulsory; students were free to
attend a study hall instead.").
11. Id. at 1357.
12. Id. at 1359.
13. Id. at 1360.
14. Id. at 1359.
15. Id. at 1360.
16. Id.




priate and should not be given," yet left the decision up to
him.1 9 None of the teachers either (a) suggested the speech
might violate a school rule, or (b) notified the administration
prior to the assembly of Fraser's speech.20
The day after he gave the speech, Fraser was given notice
that he was being charged with violating the school's disruptive
conduct rule.21 He was given an opportunity to explain his
speech and admitted to intentionally using sexual innuendo to
capture attention and gain victory for his candidate.2 2 He then
was informed he would be suspended for three days, and his
name would be removed from consideration as a graduation
speaker.23
On the morning after the speech, four teachers gave written
notice to the assistant principal complaining of Fraser's
speech.2 4 None of the letters suggested the speech disrupted the
assembly or interfered with school activities, but three teachers
disapproved of the speech as "inappropriate" for a high school
assembly.25 Additionally, a home economics teacher testified
that during a class following the speech, students expressed
enough interest to discuss the speech for approximately ten
minutes.2
Fraser filed a complaint under the U.S. Constitution and
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Judge Tanner presided
over a hearing in the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Washington.28 He ruled: (1) the suspension violated Fra-
ser's right of free expression under the first amendment of the
Federal Constitution; (2) the school's disruptive conduct rule
was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (3) removal of Fra-
19. Id. at 3162.
20. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3171.
21. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1357.
22. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3161.
23. Id.
24. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1360.
25. Id. at 1360-61 & n.3.
26. Id. at 1360 ("Judge Tanner [at trial] summarized her testimony as follows: 'On
the day after the speech was delivered a teacher found that students in her class were
more interested in discussing the speech than attending to classwork.' ").
27. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1357. The oral opinion, findings of fact, conclusions of law
and judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton, the Honorable Jack Tanner presiding, are unreported.
28. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3163.
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ser's name from the list of candidates for graduation speaker vi-
olated due process due to the failure of the disciplinary rules to
specify such sanctions; and (4) sua sponte, the suspension vio-
lated state law.2 9 On September 1, 1983, the District Court
awarded Fraser $278.00 in damages and $12,750.00 as costs and
attorney's fees. 0
On March 4, 1985, a three Judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the judgment of the District Court, with Justice Wright
dissenting."' The central issue was whether school officials had
the power to punish a high school student who used sexual innu-
endo, without obscenity or offensive words, in a speech concern-
ing student politics.32 The school district urged, based on an ex-
tension of F.C.C. v. Pacifica, that nonobscene sexual innuendo in
a high school context should be excepted from first amendment
protection. 3 The Ninth Circuit declined to recognize such an ex-
tension of Pacifica, holding:
We fear that if school officials had the unbridled discre-
tion to apply a standard as subjective and elusive as 'in-
decency' in controlling the speech of high school stu-
dents, it would increase the risk of cementing white,
middle-class standards for determining what is accept-
able and proper speech and behavior in public schools.3 4
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit thought Kuhlman's overwhelming vic-
tory was persuasive evidence that fellow students believed Fra-
ser's speech to be neither indecent nor offensive.3 5
The second issue was whether the speech caused a material
disruption in Bethel's educational process. The Ninth Circuit
held that "a noisy response to the speech and sexually sugges-
tive movements by three students in a crowd of 600 fail to rise
to the level of material interference with the educational process
29. Id.
30. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1358.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 1363.
34. Id. The Supreme Court seemed to take offense at this remark, or at least thought
it indicative of the weakness of the Ninth Circuit's decision.
35. Id. "Whether [Fraser] succeeded or whether he went over the line of good taste
and became offensive is for his fellow students to judge when they cast their ballots in
the school elections." Id.
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that justifies impinging on Fraser's First Amendment right to
express himself freely."36
The third issue decided by the Ninth Circuit was whether
the forum in which the speech was given was a school function
which would allow the school to regulate the content of the
speeches presented.37 Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged
that Fraser's speech was delivered during a school sponsored as-
sembly (indeed, the school district thought this fact was disposi-
tive of the issue), 8 it maintained:
[H]is speech was clearly not part of the school cur-
riculum. The assembly, which was run by students, was a
voluntary activity in which students were invited to give
their own speeches, not speeches prescribed by school au-
thorities as part of the educational program. Attendance,
moreover, was not compulsory; students were free to at-
tend a study hall instead. 9
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that in exercising his first
amendment rights at the assembly, Fraser was as free to express
himself as if he had been in the school cafeteria, or on the school
steps. 10
Judge Wright's dissent began with a presumption against
judicial involvement in schools.'" He then listed several factors
to support this presumption, which give schools a unique posi-
tion in first amendment law. First, students are essentially a
"captive audience.""' Second, the speech was made by a minor
to other minors.43 Third, the school's special responsibility to in-
culcate societal values puts it in the best position to determine
whether the speech was harmful to other minors, and the courts
should show great deference to those determinations."
36. Id. at 1360.
37. See id. at 1363.
38. The school district's contention was based on WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.58.115
(1982 & Supp. 1987) ("an 'associated student body' means the formal organization of the
students of the school formed with the approval of and regulation by the board of direc-
tors of the school district").
39. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1364.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 1366.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and the oral argu-
ment took place in March of 1986. The Court said, in an opinion
handed down in July of 1986, that the first amendment did not
prevent the school district from disciplining Fraser for giving the
speech at a school assembly."5 The Court, relying on the sepa-
rate standards for children and adults articulated in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independant Community School District, F.C.C. v.
Pacifica Foundation, and, most recently, New Jersey v. T.L.O,
held that children in public school may be protected from expo-
sure to offensive spoken language."6
Second, the Court held that the circumstances of Fraser's
suspension did not violate due process because both the school
disciplinary code and the prespeech admonitions of the teachers
put him on notice that delivering the speech could subject him
to sanctions. 7
Justice Brennan, concurring in judgment, stated that under
the circumstances it was permissible for the school district to
deem Fraser's speech exceeded permissible limits. ' He wrote
separately to underscore his understanding of the narrowness of
the Court's holding, and in so doing emphasized (1) that the
same speech given outside the school environment could not be
penalized by government officials who simply thought it inap-
propriate, and (2) that the language may be inappropriate in
light of the circumstances, but it was not obscene." Justice Mar-
shall, in dissent, agreed with Justice Brennan that the speech
was not obscene and thought the school district did not demon-
strate that Fraser's remarks were in fact disruptive.50 Dissenting,
Justice Stevens disagreed on the adequacy of Fraser's notice of
sanctions, and agreed with the Ninth Circuit that sexually sug-
gestive movements by three students in a crowd of 600 failed to
rise to the level of material disruption. 1
45. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159.
46. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
47. The Supreme Court added, "Two days suspension from school does not rise to
the level of a penal sanction calling for the full panoply of procedural due process protec-
tion." Fraser, 106 S.Ct. at 3166-67.
48. Id. at 3167.
49. Id. at 3167-68.
50. Id. at 3168-69.
51. Id. at 3169-72.
[Vol. V
COMMENTS
The precedential foundation supporting the first amend-
ment's application to school behavior was, for over two decades,
built solidly on Tinker, which involved three high school stu-
dents who were suspended for wearing black armbands in sym-
bolic protest of the war in Vietnam.52 The Supreme Court an-
nounced the following test in Tinker: "[T]he regulation would
violate the constitutional rights of students, at least if it could
not be justified by a showing that the students' activities would
materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of
the school. ' 3 Typically, 4 courts begin a discussion of the first
amendment's application to school issues by noting the Tinker
court's statement that students do not "shed their constitutional
rights of freedom of speech or expression at the school-house
gate. ' 55 However, many subsequent qualifications of this lauda-
ble dicta have reduced it to quicksand, causing reliance on it to
consistently fall into controversy.56 Reasonable people can and
do differ on what satisfies the Tinker "substantial disruption"
test. However, it is apparent that once an event is deemed "dis-
ruptive," students still do not lose their rights at the school-
house gate but instead shed them once they are firmly inside the
confines of academia.
The Ninth Circuit began by analyzing Tinker,57 and sought
to justify the role of the judicial branch in resolving first amend-
ment controversies between public school officials and students
by citing the case of West Virginia v. Barnette:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
states, protects citizens against the state itself and all of
its creatures, Boards of Education not excepted. These
have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discre-
tionary functions, but none that they may not perform
within the limits of the Bill of Rights. 8
The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to apply the Tinker "substan-
52. Tinker, 393 U.S 503 (1969).
53. Id. at 513.
54. Note the following occurrence in both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court
decisions.
55. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
56. See cases cited supra note 5. See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
57. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1358.
58. West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
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tial disruption" test: "As the Supreme Court said in Tinker, stu-
dent speech or conduct is not 'immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech' if it 'materially disrupts class-
work or involves substantial disorder of the rights of others.' '"
After a close and detailed analysis of the record at trial, the
Ninth Circuit held that on the issue of disruption this case was
indistinguishable from Tinker, because the record showed no ev-
idence that Fraser's use of sexual innuendo materially interfered
with any activities of the school. 0 What is most important for
this analysis at this point, however, is that the Ninth Circuit did
in fact conscientiously apply the "material disruption" standard
in Tinker.
The Ninth Circuit readily acknowledged Fraser's speech
may have been inappropriate. 1 Indeed, four teachers claimed as
much in written statements.2 Additionally, both the principal
and the assistant principal testified the 'word "inappropriate"
was synonymous with the word "disruptive" in a school con-
text."' Yet the Ninth Circuit clearly thought there was an impor-
tant difference between the two standards: "The mere fact that
some members of the school community considered Fraser's
speech to be inappropriate does not necessarily mean it was dis-
ruptive of the educational process."" In an attempt to be faith-
ful to the language in Tinker the Ninth Circuit acknowledged
the two competing tests and announced, "[T]he First Amend-
ment standard Tinker requires us to apply is material disrup-
tion, not inappropriateness."65 Although this has been called a
"'hazardous freedom,' "66 the Ninth Circuit thought such open-
ness "'is the basis of our national strength and of the in-
dependance and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this
relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.' ",67
Justice Wright, in dissent, charged that the majority misun-
59. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1359 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
60. See id. at 1360.
61. See id. at 1361. The Court of Appeals "recognize[d] that the principal, assistant
principals and some teachers thought that Fraser's speech was inappropriate." Id.
62. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3167.
63. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1361.
64. Id.
65. Id.




derstood and misapplied Tinker."' He supported this view by re-
lying on a law review article which stressed the uniquenesss of
the public school environment:
In determining where school authorities may draw
the line (regarding obscenity, vulgarity, and indecency)
courts must consider not only the fact that teen-age chil-
dren are involved, but also the fact that the school is a
special purpose environment existing under peculiar soci-
ological conditions . . . . It follows that a substantial de-
gree of social propriety is called for in the operation of an
effective educational system. It might even be said . . .
that discouragement of the use of obscene or profane lan-
guage is a function of the school. 9
Justice Wright's dissenting opinion clarified the item of conten-
tion: What standard shall be applied to measure the permissible
gap between protected adult discourse and unprotected adoles-
cent discourse? Of course, this question presupposes that stu-
dents invariably leave some of their rights at the schoolhouse
gate. The inquiry, however, has shifted to precisely how much
first amendment protection is lost at the entrance to academia.
Justice Black's dissent, combined with Harlan's brief dis-
sent in Tinker, embodies the de facto standard for analyzing
first amendment rights of students in public schools. 70 Black's
and Harlan's prescient approach manifested itself in Justice
Wright's dissent in the Ninth Circuit, and the majority of the
Supreme court has now placed it firmly amongst accepted crite-
ria in our Constitutional constellation.7 1 Although the majority
of the Supreme Court claims to use the disruption standard in
Fraser, this analysis will show they are in fact applying the
68. Fraser, 755. F.2d at 1366.
69. Haskel, Student Expression in the Public Schools: Tinker Distinguished, 59
GEo. L.J. 37, 57-58 (1970).
70. As argued throughout this paper, the Court claims to apply the Tinker "substan-
tial disruption" test, yet is in fact applying the much lower standard suggested by Jus-
tice Black in his dissenting opinion in Tinker, a distraction/diversion standard. Justice
Harlan's dissenting opinion in Tinker is analytically similar in that he believes "[s]chool
officials should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline and good or-
der in their institutions," though he did not actually specify what standard he would
employ. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526.
71. However, the majority did not acknowledge that it was in fact applying the ra-
tionale of Justice Black's dissent in Tinker. See id.
1987]
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much lower diversion/distraction standard as advocated by Jus-
tice Black in Tinker.
72
Although Justice Black did not explicitly define this stan-
dard,73 we can be sure he meant it to be an easier standard to
meet than actual disruption:
While the absence of obscene remarks or boisterous and
loud disorder perhaps justifies the Court's statement that
the few armband students did not actually "disrupt" the
classwork, I think the record overwhelmingly shows that
the armbands did exactly what the elected school officials
and principals foresaw they would, that is, took the stu-
dents' minds off their classwork and diverted them to
thoughts about the highly emotional Vietnam war. 4
The record in Tinker indicated the armbands (worn by seven of
18,000 students)7 "caused comments, warnings by other stu-
dents, and poking fun."1 6 Additionally, as in Fraser, one class in
the school devoted some time to speaking about the issue. Jus-
tice Black argued that the armbands (to his credit he did not
suggest they disrupted anything) "took the students' minds off
their classwork and diverted them."
77
Justice Black's diversion standard was conceived in the
highly emotional times of the Vietnam war.7 8 From the perspec-
tive of more than two decades later, it seems likely that symbolic
reminders of the war would in fact easily divert student atten-
tion from their work. But Justice Black intended the standard to
apply in a great many educational situations beyond these rela-
tively rare emotional occurrences. 79 In Waugh v. Mississippi
72. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting).
73. See id.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 508.
76. Id. at 517.
77. Id. at 517-18.
78. Justice Black, writing in 1969, recognized the country was in the middle of the
conflict.
79. It is a reasonable inference to suggest that Justice Black wanted the distraction/
diversion approach to apply to a wider scope of situations than just those involving the
highly emotional war because he cited Waugh v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Miss.,
237 U.S. 589 (1915), which involved a fraternity situation, which is presumably much less
emotional than a war.
[Vol. V
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University,8" school authorities had passed a law barring stu-
dents from peaceably assembling in fraternities and allowing the
school to suspend anyone who joined fraternities. Justice Black,
stating that "[t]he true principles on this entire subject were in
my judgment spoken" by the Court in Waugh,8 quoted the fol-
lowing language:
"Membership in the prohibited societies divided the at-
tention of the students and distracted from that single-
ness of purpose which the State desired to exist in its
public educational institutions. It is not for us to enter-
tain conjectures in opposition to the views of the State
and annul its regulations upon disputable considerations
of their wisdom or necessity."8
Clearly, Justice Black intended to distinguish the distraction/di-
version standard from the higher test of actual disruption in
holding Tinker could be disciplined for his actions. To empha-
size his point, he again quoted the above language from Waugh
later in his opinion.8
The concomitant attribute of this relatively lower diversion/
distraction standard is Justice Black's notion that
"[u]ncontrolled and uncontrollable liberty is an enemy to do-
mestic peace. '"84 In response to the Ninth Circuit's suggestion
that we must leave the decisions on these matters at least par-
tially to the students,85 and that our Constitution calls for "haz-
ardous freedom '86 in which we take reasonable risks to maintain
our cherished liberties, Justice Black stated that if students "can
defy and flout orders of school officials to keep their minds on
their own schoolwork, it is a beginning of a new revolutionary
era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the judiciary. "87
Concern about uncontrollable liberty and revolutionary permis-
siveness brings one to a diversion/distraction approach to stu-
dent behavior which maintains maximum order. Finding actual
80. 237 U.S. 589 (1915).
81. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522.
82. Id. at 523 (quoting Waugh, 237 U.S. at 597) (emphasis added by Justice Black).
83. Id. at 524.
84. Id.
85. See supra note 35.
86. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
87. Id. at 518.
1987] 199
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disruption becomes unnecessary.88 Acts may be diverting and
distracting without actually disrupting the educational process.
In Fraser, for example, the speech caused no reaction "atypical"
of any other high school assembly and there was no evidence the
speech disrupted the school's educational mission. 9
In the opening paragraph of its opinion, the Supreme Court
characterized Fraser's speech as "an elaborate, graphic, and ex-
plicit sexual metaphor." 90 Chief Justice Burger wrote, "some
students hooted and yelled; some by gestures graphically simu-
lated the sexual activities pointedly alluded to in respondent's
speech." '91 This description may seem less than faithful to the
finding of facts by the lower courts;92 yet this willingness to
stretch the facts reflects the approach of a court intent on find-
ing disruption in acts two previous courts found merely to rise to
the level of distraction or diversion.
93
The Supreme Court altered the standard announced in the
decision in Tinker for dealing with cases precisely like Fraser,
perhaps because Fraser's speech involved sexual innuendo.9 , To
justify this modified approach the Court explained the essence
of public education as "the 'inculcation of fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political sys-
tem.' "" The Court then explained its balancing test as follows:
"The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controver-
sial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against
88. In that "to distract" is a lower standard than "to disrupt," one need not find
actual disruption when searching for distraction.
89. See Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1359-60.
90. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3160-61.
91. Id. at 3162.
92. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1359. The "hooting and yelling" was, according to the person
who heard it, "not too dissimilar to any auditorium sounds I have heard over the many
assemblies I have been at Bethel High School." The Supreme Court omitted this fact.
Additionally, another teacher present reported, "the kids were just saying, yahoo, won-
derful, we are all for it." Id. at 1360.
93. It is important that the Supreme Court deem these acts disruptive if they are to
fit them into the Tinker test and thereby hold the remarks exceeded permissible limits.
To say they were merely distracting, as the two lower courts held, would be to protect
Fraser's speech or to develop new precedent and impliedly overrule Tinker.
94.. It is not unreasonable to suggest, as the school district did, that Tinker is analyti-
cally inappropriate to compare with Fraser because Tinker did not involve suggestive
speech.




the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behaviour." 96 Since "the
schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to experi-
ence the power of the government, '97 the level of protection we
afford controversial speech in the classroom is surely an accurate
reflection of our commitment to cherished principles of
democracy.
Chief Justice Burger stated that Fraser's speech included
''pervasive sexual innuendo [that] .. .was plainly offensive to
both teachers and students - indeed to any mature person."98
This statement is puzzling, partly because neither a single
teacher nor student claimed the speech was offensive."9 The dis-
trict court did not find the speech offensive. 100 Nor did the
Ninth Circuit believe the speech to be offensive. 01 Moreover,
the Tinker standard speaks to disruption as the touchstone for
finding indecent speech, not offensiveness.0 2 The Court, appar-
ently on its own initiative, has incorporated offensiveness as a
component of a diversion/distraction standard.'0
Chief Justice Burger next stated, "By glorifying male sexu-
ality, and in its verbal content, the speech was acutely insulting
to teenage girl students."10 One may ask, if it was acutely in-
sulting to teenage girls, would it not also be insulting to teenage
boys and, for that matter, all females and males? Yet no student
testified that the speech was insulting. 05 Nor does it seem likely
that Kuhlman would proceed to an overwhelming victory if the
speech deeply insulted so many. What in fact happened is that
three students reacted in a sexual manner, some students
96. Id. This reference is perplexing because it refers to the political views in Tinker
and is applied in the context of Fraser's sexual innuendo. Fraser's speech was not an
"unpopular view" as much as a controversial presentation.
97. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385 (1985).
98. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3165.
99. There were allegations of inappropriateness by the teachers, but no one claimed
the speech was offensive. See supra notes 19, 25 and accompanying text.
100. See Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1358.
101. Id. at 1363.
102. Id. at 1359.
103. Since the Tinker standard does not address offensiveness, but rather "material
and substantial disruption," it is reasonable to suggest the Supreme Court took it upon
itself to add "offensiveness" as a component of the Tinker test.
104. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3165.
105. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1361 n.4.
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seemed bewildered, and all of this happened in a context de-
scribed as typical of any other Bethel assembly. ' °1
The court next turned to the decision in Pacifica.10 In
Pacifica, the Court determined prurient appeal is an element of
obscenity, but it is not an element of indecency, which merely
refers to nonconformance with contemporary standards of mo-
rality. The Court upheld the FCC's right to ban George Carlin's
monologue from the air-waves, in part because there were likely
to be children in the audience. 0 8 In Fraser, the Supreme Court
stated: "'"Such utterances [Fraser's speech] are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to the truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."' ,.o9 Fraser's speech, however, was part of an
"idea" intended to draw attention to a candidate and describe
his character, all of which was, apparently, enormously success-
ful." It also appears from the facts that order and morality
were not maligned, at least in that the assembly was not
delayed, nor did anyone complain of a lack of morality in his
speech.
One may confess to confusion regarding the Court's ap-
proach up to this point. However, in the next paragraph of the
decision, the Court quoted Justice Black's dissenting opinion in
Tinker as being "especially relevant in this case": 1 "'I wish
therefore . . . to disclaim any purpose . . . to hold that the fed-
eral Constitution compels the teachers, parents and elected
school officials to surrender control of the American public
school system to public school students.' ""' This quote reveals
the true relevance of Tinker and the spirit in which the Su-
preme Court approached the facts. " The district court, two
judges of the Ninth Circuit, and four justices on the Supreme
106. Id. at 1359-60.
107. F.C.C. v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
108. Id. at 740, 749.
109. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3166 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746 (quoting Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))).
110. His candidate, Kuhlman, won by a wide margin.
111. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3166.
112. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522, 526).
113. By quoting Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Tinker, Chief Justice Burger's
opinion in Fraser impliedly subscribes to the logic behind Black's dissent. See id.
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Court agreed that Fraser's remarks could not be construed as
disruptive.'" What is clear, however, is that Fraser's speech was
"inappropriate" because it distracted (three students in 600 at
the assembly) and it diverted (the next day approximately ten
minutes of a class were devoted to talking about it), no matter
how briefly, the school's educational mission with regard to
those students affected. This distraction/diversion standard,
which Justice Black argued for in Tinker, and the Court tacitly
approved in Fraser, seems perfectly reasonable."8 Yet it is not
clear why the Court stated approval of the majority approach in
Tinker, yet applied Justice Black's test.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Blackmun, began with skepticism: "I find it difficult to believe it
is the same speech the court describes;""' and then offered a
simple proposition:
[T]he most that can be said about respondent's speech -
and all that need be said - is that in light of the discre-
tion school officials have to teach high school students
how to conduct civil and effective public discourse, and
to prevent disruption of school educational activities, it
was not unconstitutional for school officials to conclude,
under the circumstances of this case, that respondent's
remarks exceeded permissible limits." 7
Justice Brennan then cited Tinker to support the proposition
that "[i]f respondent had given the same speech outside of the
school environment he could not have been penalized simply be-
cause government officials considered his language to be inap-
propriate.""' 8 This indicates that both Justices Brennan and
Blackmun believe it was constitutional for the school district,
given the facts of the case, to punish Fraser merely on a showing
of inappropriateness. According to Justice Brennan's concur-
rence, "school officials sought only to ensure that the high school
114. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White, Powell, Blackmun, Marshall,
and Stevens all agreed that the speech was not disruptive. Id. at 3162.
115. That is, reasonable people can differ on what the permissible standard of dis-
course should be by minors in public schools. What is distressing, however, is when the
Supreme Court announces one standard and applies another.
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assembly proceeded in an orderly manner."" 9 Thus, Justice
Brennan indicates that the most effective way of ensuring order-
liness is to allow the school district to determine what is appro-
priate.120 In light of the school officials' belief that disruptive is
"synonymous with inappropriate,'' Justice Brennan's position
is the equivalent of allowing the school board to be the ultimate
arbiter of "appropriateness."'
22
Justice Brennan recognized that Fraser's language was not
even close to being obscene, as the standard was announced in
Ginsberg v. New York. 2 ' His concurring opinion emphasized the
public school setting of Fraser, which is apparently the sole loca-
tion in which he believes the majority's holding is applicable.1
2 4
Justice Brennan maintained that the Court's holding "could not
refer to the government's authority generally to regulate the lan-
guage used in public debate outside the school environment.' 25
Justice Brennan believed it was necessary to highlight this point
because the majority stated, " '[n]othing in the Constitution pro-
hibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression
are inappropriate and subject to sanctions.' "126 Although the
context of the paragraph in which the majority held the above
was a public school setting, the strong language could cause
many to ponder the extent to which it is applicable outside the
public school. Justice Brennan, who is in the better position to
judge the majority's intent, obviously thought it necessary to
clarify the point for the sake of his own conscience.
Justice Brennan then pointed out, contrary to the majority's
119. Id. at 3168.
120. See id. Since Justice Brennan believed the district can punish merely on a show-
ing of inappropriateness, and the school officials just sought to make the assembly pro-
ceed in an orderly manner, it follows that the district can ensure orderliness by deter-
mining what is appropriate.
121. See Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1361.
122. If the school board can ensure orderliness by determining what is disruptive,
and disruptive is the same as inappropriate, the school board can ensure orderliness by
determining what is appropriate. See id.
123. "Moreover, despite the Court's characterizations, the language respondent used
is far removed from the very narrow class of 'obscene' speech which the Court has held is
not protected by the First Amendment." Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3167 (citing Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)).
124. At least by implication Justice Brennan is intent on giving a very narrow read-
ing to the majority position, which is why he wrote separately.
125. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3167 n.1.
126. Id. (quoting 106 S. Ct. at 3165).
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1
implication, that the record contained no evidence that any stu-
dent found Fraser's speech insulting.127 He noted that Fraser
could not be penalized merely because school officials considered
the text of his speech inappropriate. 128 Indeed, to his mind, Fra-
ser's speech was "no more 'obscene,' 'lewd,' or 'sexually explicit'
than the bulk of programs currently appearing on prime time
television or in the local cinema.'"2 This reflects a vastly differ-
ent analytical approach than that of the Court, which deemed
Fraser's speech an acutely insulting and plainly offensive prod-
uct of a "confused boy."
1 '
Justice Brennan "disagree[d] with the Court's suggestion
that school officials could punish respordent's speech out of a
need to protect younger students."13' Having determined that
Fraser's speech was insulting, indecent and a hazard to younger
students, the Court approached realization of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's fear that complete school board discretion will cement
white middle-class standards of acceptability in public dis-
course.182 Justice Brennan himself echoed this sentiment in his
dissenting opinion in Pacifica, when he said the Court's decision
was another example of "the dominant culture's inevitable ef-
forts to force those groups who do not share its mores to con-
form to its way of thinking, acting, and speaking."' 83 Yet, ac-
cording to Justice Brennan, the distinguishing element in Fraser
is the school official's right to ensure an orderly assembly.
Justice Brennan's approach is puzzling in that it analyzed
the facts so closely on the one hand yet still concluded that the
majority's holding "concerns only the authority that school offi-
cials have to restrict a high school student's use of disruptive
language in a speech given to a high school assembly."' 34 He did
not articulate what was disruptive, nor indicate a permissible
standard of disruption, but only that the school district may de-
127. Id. at 3168 n.2. The student's reaction ranged from bewilderment to excitement,
but there was no evidence anyone was insulted. Indeed, that would be contrary to Fra-
ser's goal of getting his candidate elected.
128. Id. at 3167.
129. Id. at 3168 n.2.
130. Id. at 3165.
131. Id. at 3168 n.2.
132. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1363.
133. F.C.C. v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 777 (1978).
134. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3168.
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termine what is disruptive.
It is doubtful whether Justice Brennan intended to author-
ize school boards to be the arbiter of appropriate speech, espe-
cially since the facts indicate they will apply a distraction/diver-
sion standard to determine what is appropriate. His dissent in
Pacifica shows the same kinds of concern the Ninth Circuit had
in Fraser.1 5 Still, his concurring opinion in Fraser would au-
thorize the school district to apply a distraction/diversion stan-
dard to speech which may merely be inappropriate.
Finally, Justice Brennan argued that the school board's dis-
cretion is not limitless-it has a responsibility to distinguish the
vigorous from the vulgar.13 6 Yet he assures us the circumstances
of the case show enough disruption such that the discipline im-
posed on Fraser was constitutional. Consequently, Fraser sets
the standard for a threshold of disruption by which future cases
involving speech in public schools may be evaluated.
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, agreed with the
principles announced by Justice Brennan, but found the thresh-
old of disruption that was acceptable to Brennan and the major-
ity inadequate. 87 Justice Marshall thought it important that
both the district court and the Ninth Circuit "conscientiously
applied Tinker, and concluded that the Board had not demon-
strated any disruption of the educational process.""" This state-
ment indicates that Justice Marshall, like Justice Stevens, prob-
ably thought no disruption occurred. Further, his use of the
word "conscientiously" indicates that he is less than satisfied
with the majority's attempt to apply the Tinker test.
Justice Marshall acknowledged that school officers must be
shown great deference in their control over the educational pro-
cess. Yet he assumed the position that the school district had to
meet the standard announced in Tinker. Since the school dis-
trict failed, in both of the lower courts, to show Fraser's remarks
disrupted the educational process, he saw no reason to disturb
135. Justice Brennan, in Pacifica, and the Ninth Circuit majority, in Fraser, were
concerned about a kind of "acute ethnocentric myopia," Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 775, in
which majoritarian conventions would dictate permissible behavior. See generally Fra-
ser, 755 F.2d 1356.
136. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3168.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 3169.
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the Ninth Circuit's judgment.8 9
Justice Marshall was satisfied in applying the Tinker test
forthrightly. He implicitly recognized the standard as workable
and fair. Justice Stevens, however, assumed a broader approach
to the facts. He began by asserting Fraser was entitled to fair
notice of the consequences of his speech, thereby indicating his
belief that Fraser was deprived of reasonable notice.14
Justice Stevens mentioned Fraser's outstanding credentials
which
. ..indicate he was probably in a better position to de-
termine whether an audience composed of 600 of his con-
temporaries would be offended by four letter words - or
a sexual metaphor - than is a group of Judges who are
at least two generations and 3000 miles away from the
scene of the crime.
1 4
1
Like the Ninth Circuit, Justice Stevens was willing, at least par-
tially, to defer to the judgment of the individual delivering the
speech. Unlike the majority, he considered the identity of the
speaker an item to be weighed when determining whether the
speech is constitutionally protected.'43
Justice Stevens then returned to the issue of notice, ex-
plaining three theories by which we might conclude Fraser could
have known he would be punished for delivering the speech.
First, he quoted Bethel's disciplinary rule,'43 and examined the
possibility that the speech was disruptive. After analyzing the
facts, Justice Stevens proclaimed the evidence in the record
"makes it perfectly clear that respondent's speech was not 'con-
139. Id. at 3168-69.
140. Id. "It does seem to me, however, that if a student is to be punished for using
offensive speech, he is entitled to fair notice of the scope of the prohibition and the
consequences of its violation." Id.
141. Id.
142. That is, by saying Fraser was in a better position to judge the impact of the
speech on the students, he implies that we should defer to the speaker and his own
judgment, which makes additional sense here because Fraser was trying to rally support
for his cause, not offend others.
143. Bethel's disciplinary rule reads in part: "'Disruptive Conduct: Conduct which
materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, includ-
ing the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.'" Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3170 (quot-
ing Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1357 n.1).
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duct' prohibited by the disciplinary rule."' 44 Turning from dis-
ruption to the language itself, Justice Stevens argued that even
if the rule was stretched, one could not deem the speech obscene
or profane. " 5 This analysis illustrates a good faith effort to ap-
ply the Tinker standard. Justice Stevens "simply cannot under-
stand" how an impartial judge could conclude that the speech
was disruptive or indecent. " 6
He then examined the warnings given Fraser by the teach-
ers. Like the Ninth Circuit, Justice Stevens concluded that
"none of the three [teachers Fraser presented the speech to]
suggested that the speech might violate a school rule.""" How-
ever, the process of previewing the speech indicates that Fraser
"must have been aware of the possibility that it would provoke
an adverse reaction."" 8 Still, Justice Stevens concluded, "the
teachers' responses certainly did not give him any better notice
of the likelihood of discipline than the student handbook it-
self.""" This conclusion is difficult to reconcile with that of the
majority, which asserted that the teachers "advised him it was
inappropriate and should not be given. '"10
Finally, Justice Stevens addressed the "most difficult ques-
tion" of whether the speech was so obviously offensive that Fra-
ser surely knew he would be punished for delivering it. " ' Justice
Stevens' approach to this question reflects Justice Sutherland's
nuisance standard: "'[N]uisance may be merely a right thing in
the wrong place.' "152 There are places where it could be offen-
sive (a formal setting), and places where it would be thoroughly
appropriate (a school corridor or a locker room). The question
for Justice Stevens was whether the court could confidently de-








150. Id. at 3162. In fact this appears to be another example of the majority stretching
the facts to present Fraser in an unfavorable light and to make his conduct appear more
disruptive.
151. See id. at 3171.
152. Id. (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)).
[Vol. V
COMMENTS
Justice Stevens answered this question in the negative for
three reasons. First, he believed it was "highly unlikely" that
Fraser would have given the speech if he knew it would result in
sanctions. This is supported by the fact that Fraser was appar-
ently going to college and knew a suspension could be detrimen-
tal to his chances."'
Second, Justice Stevens argued for a strong presumption in
favor of free expression "wherever an issue of this kind is argua-
ble."1 " What does Justice Stevens mean by an "issue of this
kind"? Is the issue the first amendment in general, or free
speech in a high school setting? The meaning is not fully clear.
Finally, Justice Stevens argued that the Supreme Court
should defer to the district court and the circuit court, which
were both in a better position' than the Supreme Court to evalu-
ate this speech based on contemporary community standards.1 55
Justices Marshall and Stevens implicitly recognized the dif-
ficulties of legal analysis which calls for one standard - the
Tinker "substantial disruption" test - yet in fact applies a dif-
ferent standard - Justice Black's "distraction/diversion" test.
We are asked, by a Supreme Court majority intent on bending
facts to fit a misnamed mold, to accept that the "not atypical
behavior" of three students in a crowd of 600, and a ten minute
classroom discussion, rises to the level of "substantial disrup-
tion" wherein first amendment freedoms are curtailed. As Jus-
tices Marshall and Stevens indicated, a conscientious application
of the Tinker test can only lead one to the same conclusion
reached by the two lower courts.
The Supreme Court had several options in analyzing Fraser,
yet it chose the most legally pernicious approach by applying
one standard while claiming to use another. Surely it would be
more intellectually honest - with resulting clarity in precedent
and approach - to announce that Justice Black's standard of
distraction/diversion will now be the controlling test. In fact, one
may argue that the Court did precisely that by citing with ap-
proval Justice Black's dissent in Tinker. Still, it is not unreason-
able to ask our highest court for an explicit reversal, or at least
153. Id.
154. Id. at 3172.
155. Id.
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to acknowledge a modification, when that is in fact the result of
a decision.
Another response to the majority's opinion is to distinguish
Fraser16 by claiming that sexual connotation in school related
speech deserves less protection. Since these students are impres-
sionable young people relying on academia to act in loco paren-
tis, this approach may have its merits,157 but it is certainly not
served by a deceptive judiciary willing to distort facts to main-
tain precedential clarity. The Meese Commission on Pornogra-
phy is just one example of the kind of respect warped enthusi-
asm in the name of our best interest engenders. The Fraser
decision is destined to be met with the same derision.
The Tinker rationale was conceived in the turbulence of the
Vietnam era, and as such it is a model of judicial restraint in a
time when "uncontrollable liberties" threatened entrenched in-
stitutions like the judiciary. Fraser is, just as identifiably, a
product of the Reagan eighties. In a time when so many are in-
tent on going back to the future, it is troubling that the Su-
preme Court could find support for restraining freedom of
speech in a judicial triumph supporting the first amendment
(Tinker).
What is most troubling about the Fraser decision looms be-
yond the majority's transparent manipulation of the facts and
the resultant muddling of precedent; these items, at least, are
identifiable. The real harm lies in the shifting focus of the
Court's approach to first amendment issues: the Court is moving
closer to debating the merits of the speech, based on the major-
ity's reaction, rather than upholding the rights of the speaker.
With the Fraser standard, the central inquiry becomes, "How
did the students react?" If the students found the speech divert-
ing or distracting, the speech becomes an exception to first
amendment protection. In such an inquiry, the rights of the
speaker necessarily become subjugated to the majority's percep-
tion of the appropriateness, or the merits, of the speech. What is
even worse, in this instance, is that only three students in an
auditorium of 600 were distracted, and even their response was
156. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
157. This author fails to see these merits, however, especially in light of the vast




characterized as relatively normal. It seems that (far from need-
ing to offend the majority before your speech will be declared
unprotected) if virtually anyone objects, it will be an exception
to first amendment freedoms. This precedent can only do harm
to our cherished liberties.
The central inquiry in Tinker is fundamentally different
from that implied by Fraser. Based on Tinker we must ask,
"Did the school's educational mission continue relatively un-
harmed?" This standard is better suited to protecting the liber-
ties afforded by the first amendment because we can agree that
interrupting a school's educational mission is to the detriment of
all the parties involved. The Tinker standard is also, in this
sense, an easier standard to apply because "disruption" is more
quantifiable than mere "diversion."
Of course, on the continuum of "disruption to diversion,"
there is considerable room for the Court to move toward an even
more sensitive test. Did the speech shock the students? Were
the students concerned by the speech? Free speech skeptics
might say we are not even close to these standards. But, un-
doubtedly, Fraser represents considerable movement toward
asking the above questions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone
from asking whether education was disrupted to inquiring
whether anyone found the speech distracting. Although this ap-
proach may make the Court's task easier, it can only have odious
consequences for freedom of speech. When the typical reactions
of three students in a crowd of 600 causes a speaker to lose his
first amendment rights, one must question precisely where we
are heading.
Craig R. Sellers
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